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U.S. House Elections national political issues.
Those who reported that they were registered to vote were reinterviewed briefly during the last two weeks of the campaign to check on their vote intention and their responses to current national issues. A total of 5,049 respondents in the 47 districts with contested races reported their vote preference in the second wave of the survey, and they are the focus of this paper.
The survey was designed to give the sponsoring organizations a more accurate forecast of the 1986 seat swing than could be gleaned from a national cross-section survey of voters. Curiously, the poll asked no questions about the candidates (other than the vote choice), so it did not take full advantage of its design. Still, a survey with large district-level samples affords an unprecedented opportunity to examine how strategic candidacies interact with national issues to influence voting decisions.
By basing their decisions to run for Congress on national political conditions, candidates magnify the direct effects of national forces on congressional elections, even when their campaigns distract voters from national issues. Incumbents busy themselves reminding voters of the goods brought home from the federal larder, while challengersthat is, those few who actually muster a real campaign-enlist tight "sound bites" to air negative campaigns and project personal charm. None of this, of course, need have anything to do with national issues. The effects of national political conditions are enhanced by strategic career decisions quite independently of what candidates may have to say in the campaign.
Local House campaigns are not bereft of national political content, however; and insofar as they are not, our understanding of the effects of strategic politicians on the national congressional vote is incomplete. Just as shrewd candidates assess national conditions in deciding whether to make the race, so too should they consider the issues raised by national conditions in deciding how to cast their appeal. If a prospective Democratic challenger in 1982 decided that high unemployment improved her chances enough to make a run against the Republican incumbent worthwhile, would she then choose to ignore that issue in the campaign? The same national ingredients that contribute to the decision to run should similarly shape the themes of the campaign.
To the extent that voters are attentive to campaigns, their voting choices should reflect the candidates' strategic calculus. Voters in districts with strong challengers will become more attuned to national issues-at least in their local effects-than voters in districts where the campaigns are so impoverished that these issues never get aired. And 67 even those voters already disposed to respond to national forces with their vote need candidates whose positions on the issues they can compare with their own. In short, when national issues have competitive local sponsors, they should have a greater effect on individual voting preferences.
The ABC NewslWashington Post survey provides enough respondents in different electoral settings so that we can investigate the effects of local campaigns on national issue voting. Admittedly, with national political breezes calm and with many strong prospects consequently postponing their entry into the arena, the 1986 election is less promising than most for a study of the interaction of issues and candidates. Nonetheless, there is sufficient variety among the 47 contested campaigns monitored by the survey to allow us to explore this phenomenon. Indeed, if issue voting is enhanced by strong candidacies in this quiet election, interactions should be even stronger, and the impact of national issues greater, during more turbulent times.
Complementing the survey data with information on past electoral conditions in the district and on candidate expenditures from the Federal Election Commission, we have in Table 1 classified each of the 47 districts according to incumbency status and the strength of candidacies. A quirk in our data made it simple to distinguish strong from weak challengers. Among the districts sampled, every challenger spent either less than $244,000 or more than $454,000, making it easy to classify weak and strong challengers. Conveniently, this break in the data falls across the $300,000 threshold that, according to earlier work (Jacobson 1987) , is a reasonable estimate of the minimum spending necessary to mount a serious challenge in an election year without strong partisan trends. these districts. Open seats are oversampled both in the number that were surveyed and in the number of interviews taken, so we can subject voting in these districts to a much more detailed examination than was heretofore possible.3
Strategic Politicians in 1986
Regardless of national conditions, local circumstances have the strongest effect on political career strategies. This influence is most obvious when a seat becomes open; these contests attract a much higher proportion of experienced nonincumbents than do races involving incumbents (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989) . But the influence of local conditions is also evident when a seat is held by an incumbent; for example, the smaller the incumbent's margin in the last election, the more likely he or she is to face a strong challenge ( Table 2 are derived from aggregate data on the House districts that fall into the sample. They show that, as in past years (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Jacobson 1989), strong challengers ran in districts where theirparty had done comparatively well in the previous House and presidential electionsespecially, of course, the former. The remaining two rows are derived from the survey data. (The exact survey questions may be found in the Appendix). They reveal that strong challengers also prefer districts in which the distribution of party identification and voters' assessments of the Reagan administration's performance are more conducive to their success. Notice that differences between competitive districts held by either party (the middle columns) are relatively small; on three 71 of the four items, conditions in districts with a strong Republican challenger were more favorable to Republicans than were conditions in strongly contested districts held by Republicans.
Strong challengers read their opportunities with considerable accuracy. The relationships in Table 3 demonstrate that they were far more successful in winning votes than were weak challengers. The fourth column of the table shows that in late September (the first wave of the survey) a much larger proportion of voters preferred strong challengers (46.7%) than preferred weak challengers (25.7%). The strong challengers' advantage had increased by the second wave a month later: in districts with strong challengers, a larger proportion of voters initially favoring the incumbent switched to the challenger (12.6%) than vice versa (10.6%). Weak challengers lost 19.7% of their initial supporters while picking up only 6.1% of the incumbent's initial supporters. Strong challengers also picked up a larger share of undecided voters. If we combine voters who switched preferences and undecideds who made up their minds, strong challengers had picked up support from a net 2.3% of the respondents by the second wave of the survey in late October; weak challengers had lost a net 1.0%. These trends indicate that the strength of the challenge was itself contributing something to the outcome.
More evidence of the effects of strong challenges is in the last column, which displays the defection rates of party identifiers in districts with strong and weak challengers. The difference is striking. Defections to incumbents and challengers were nearly balanced in districts with strong challengers; incumbents enjoyed only a slight advantage. In districts with weak challengers, nearly half of the voters identifying with the challenger's party defected to the incumbent, while only 5% of those identifying with the incumbent's party defected to the challenger. The differences are a bit exaggerated; in districts with strong challengers, the distribution of vote intentions in the sample matches the actual district vote very closely, but for districts with weak challengers the match is poorer, with challengers actually doing, on average, about 6 percentage points better on election day than they did in the survey. Still, it is clear that partisan defections are far more evenly balanced in races involving strong challengers. There is no obvious reason that this result should be attributed to differences among districts; it is more plausibly interpreted as a consequence of differences among challenges.
National Issues
With the strength of the challenge by itself having such a large effect on individual voting and with so few seats changing hands 72 
Note: For columns 1-4, the number of cases is in parentheses; for the final column (indicating party loyalty) the figure in parentheses is the number of cases from which percentages were computed.
nationally, one might conclude that national issues were unimportant in the 1986 House elections. That conclusion would be wrong. National issues plainly did play an important role in the 1986 House elections. The potential magnitude of their impact is shown in Table 5 . Entries in the table are computed from the probit coefficients in the equations in Table 4 . The middle column lists the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate, depending on the voter's party identification and the challenger's strength but assuming the voter takes neutral positions on all three issue items. The column to the left shows what that probability would become if the respondent's position on all three issue items favored the Republicans (that is, if the respondent strongly approved of Reagan's performance, thought the economy was getting better, and did not want to trade SDI for an arms control agreement). The column to the right shows what that probability would become if the respondent's position favored the Democrats on all three items. A comparison of the right and left hand columns shows that views on national issues could make a difference of as much as .39 in districts held by Democrats and .52 in districts held by Republicans in the probability that a respondent would vote for the Democrat. Note: "Favor Republicans" = approve strongly of Reagan's performance, think the economy is improving, oppose trading SDI for an arms control agreement. "Favor Democrats" = disapprove strongly of Reagan's performance, think the economy is getting worse, support trading SDI for an arms control agreement. "Neutral" = neither approve nor disapprove of Reagan's performance, think the economy is staying the same, no opinion on SDI.
Observe also, however, that the strength of the challenge has a large impact on the vote even when partisanship and national issues are taken into account. It makes a difference of up to. 17 in Democratic districts and up to .24 in Republican districts in the probability that a respondent would vote for the Democrat. That is, the 20-point advantage enjoyed by strong challengers, evident in Table 3 , holds up with controls on partisanship and national issues. 
Interactions
Candidacies and national issues separately influence the vote choice; do they also reinforce one another's effects? There are good theoretical reasons for expecting that national issues would have a greater impact on voters' decisions in competitive elections than in noncompetitive ones. Without an active opponent, the incumbent's unchallenged personal stature and performance may dominate the decision to the exclusion of other issues. Voters may find it more difficult to express their views on national politics via the ballot without a visible alternative candidate to embody them. Potentially compelling national issues may have little effect if no candidate has the resources to exploit them. Previous research on this question has produced decidedly mixed results (Jacobson 1986 ). In 1986, however, interactions are clearly evident. As the results reported in Table 6 show, the impact of issues was enhanced by a strong challenge. The issue index used in these equations is a simple additive index constructed from respondents' views on Reagan, the economy, and SDI. It takes values ranging from -4 (issue positions most favorable to Republicans) to +4 (issue positions most favorable to Democrats).4 Figures 1, 2 , and 3 illustrate graphically how these interactions worked. Figure  3 shows the effects of the same variables on independent voters in both types of districts. In all three settings, the impact of issues is larger in districts with strong challengers, and the effect of a strong challenge is enhanced among voters with issue positions favorable to the challenger's party. Figure 1 shows that strong Republican challengers were better able to use favorable issue positions to stem defections to the Democratic incumbent and to win Democratic votes than mere weak Repub- Because Reagan's performance was the most influential of the three issues we examine, our results suggest that the widespread approval of Reagan (see Table 2 ) should have been an important Republican asset. Certainly it offered some advantage to strong Republican challengers, though there were few around to enjoy it. But it is important to remember that Republican challengers were, by definition, trying to do better than their predecessors had in 1984, when Reagan was equally popular and also headed the ticket. The president's continuing popularity may have conferred little additional advantage and so may 
Note: The number of cases from which percentages were computed are in parentheses.
not have helped Republican challengers actually win, though it may have kept them from losing by larger margins. There is evidence for this explanation in the aggregate data; the vote for strong Republican challengers fell less than the vote for weak Republican challengers between 1984 and 1986. While Reagan's popularity may not have boosted Republican challengers to victory, it no doubt made life more difficult for Democratic challengers. Its effect was mitigated, however, because negative voting predominated in 1986. That is, disapproval of the president's performance had a much larger effect on voting than did approval (Kernell 1977 ). The evidence is in Table 7 . Republicans who disapproved of Reagan's performance were twice as likely to defect to the opposition in House contests as were Democrats who approved of it. And Democrats who disapproved of Reagan's performance were noticeably less likely to defect than were Republicans who approved it. Among independent voters, disapprovers voted more consistently for the Democrat than approvers voted for the Republican. Thus disapproval of Reagan had a much more decisive impact on voters' House choices than did approval.
Open Seats
Open seats pose special opportunities for prospective candidates. With more than 90% of incumbents normally winning reelection, Strategic reactions to national conditions may be similarly muted in the candidates' selection of campaign issues. Without an incumbent who has a record to defend, neither candidate has a suitable local target to attack for unpopular national policies. Moreover, both candidates can embrace the same popular policies, thus neutralizing these issues in voters' decisions. Just as nonincumbent Republicans were free to dissociate themselves from Reaganomics in 1982, their Democratic counterparts were free to praise the popular president in 1986. This argument does not mean that national issues have no place in campaigns for open seats. Voters in these districts did respond to national conditions in making their choice, and we may assume that what concerns voters will also concern candidates. The absence of an incumbent and abundance of vigorous campaigns does mean, however, that national issues may be played out differently in different open districts.
All of the open districts in the sample attracted a strong candidate from at least one party, and three produced strong candidates from both parties (see Table 1 Table 8 .
Across the nine open seats surveyed, voters' views on national issues contributed substantially to their choice. All of the issue coefficients display the correct sign; only SDI falls short of statistical significance. The strength of the candidates also has a major influence on the vote; the estimated effect of these variables in combination is shown in Table 9 . By this evidence, the potential impact of national issues on the vote choice is at least as great in open seats as it is in districts contested by incumbents (compare Table 9 with Table 5 ). The probability of voting for the Democrat could vary by as much as .44 between voters who favored the Republican side on all three issues and those who favored the Democratic side on all three issues. The strength of candidacies also has a notable effect, with a difference as large as .37 in the probability of voting for the Democrat between districts in which only the Democrat was a strong candidate and districts in which only the Republican was a strong candidate.
81
Issues switching representatives, open-seat campaigns invite strong candidates to mold campaigns that best match their strengths and the perceived concerns of the district. Thus interaction effects are likely to be idiosyncratic and complex (Jacobson and Kernell 1987) . A final caveat is in order. Constrained as we are by the limits of the survey, our models are obviously oversimplified. We do not, for example, have any measures of voters' evaluations of the pair of candidates running in the district, and it is easy to imagine a variety of complex paths that might link, say, party identification, issue positions, candidate evaluations, and candidate strength. Hence we do not claim to offer comprehensive models of the vote choice in 1986. Our purpose has been narrower: to demonstrate that candidacies and issues interact to influence voting behavior in House elections. The evidence presented here, however, suggests that the dichotomy between candidate and issue voting is-or at least, can be-a false one. In a setting where political parties fail to serve as effective vehicles for programs, issues depend heavily upon the sponsorship of politicians. If candidates fail to embrace issues, or if those who do embrace issues fail through lack of talent or resources to attract the attention of voters, issues cannot have much chance of influencing voting decisions.
If issues are to influence voters, voters must have a choice. In congressional elections, choice requires strong challengers. Challengers are the political system's natural risk takers. While incumbents may be perfectly content to ignore controversial issues and to stress instead nonpartisan services to the district, challengers, unable to make such an appeal, will search for issues to exploit wherever they may be found, whether in the incumbent's record or national conditions. The interaction between candidate strength and issue voting presented here rests fully on the ability of the challenger to mount a serious campaign.
National forces in 1986 presented few exploitable issues for congressional candidates of either party. Hence, a comparatively feeble crop of challengers took on the typically well-endowed class of incumbents. As a consequence, not much happened; the Democrats gained five House seats. And yet, even in 1986, where local conditions were conducive to issue voting, issue voting appeared. In races involving well-financed nonincumbents, the electoral effects of voters' opinions
